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Abstract. Informational lobbying -  the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private 
information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to imple- 
ment particular policies -  is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper ana- 
lyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have 
private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policyma- 
ker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or 
conceal its private information. 
It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobby- 
ing can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry 
information in the 'right direction'. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the mes- 
sage as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in 
the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation 
between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost 
of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity 
between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. 
Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. 
Much o  f  the pressure  placed upon government and its agencies takes the  form o  f freely provid- 
ed "'objective" studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment 
of particular policies (Bartlett,  1973: 133, his quotation marks). 
The analysis here is vague.  What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities 
have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that 
wouM explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) 
and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole,  1989: Ch.  1.3,  p. 77,  Rent- 
seeking behavior). 
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1.  Introduction 
Providing policymakers and legislators with information is often asserted to be 
one  of the  most  important  means  by  which  interest  groups  influence the 
policymaking process. As Ornstein and Elder (1978:  75) put it, "the ability of 
a group to command facts, figures, and technical information in support of its 
positions  is  another  key organizational resource.  (...)  Whether it is  labor 
offering evidence on the noninflationary impact of increasing the minimum 
wage, oil interest groups outlining the limits of available oil reserves in the 
United States, Rockwell International detailing the technical capabilities and 
strategic necessity of the B-1  bomber, or companies describing the scientific 
reason for opposing specific limits on various chemical auto emissions, a group 
that can provide persuasive data to support its case has an important advan- 
tage." Although policymakers recognize that interest groups may have valua- 
ble expertise and specialized private information, they are quite aware of the 
strategic incentives interest groups have in presenting (or withholding) this in- 
formation in a 'favorable' way (see, e.g., Zeigler and Baer, 1969:  109; Schloz- 
man and Tierney, 1982:  298).  "This need not imply outright lie or dishonest 
manipulation,  although these  cannot be  excluded with certainty" (Appels, 
1985:  308). 
From a positive-theoretic point of view then, the omnipresence and impor- 
tance  of informational or  persuasive  lobbying is  not  unproblematic.  Why 
should a policymaker believe the messages by an interest group if the latter can 
be assumed to submit its information in a self-interested manner whenever this 
is profitable? Alternatively, if policymakers would not take account of mes- 
sages by an interest group, why then should the latter take the (often substan- 
tial) cost or trouble of lobbying? But differently, is there a scope and rationale 
for informational lobbying in a world of self-interested agents with rational ex- 
pectations? Furthermore, if such a base exists, when is informational lobbying 
more or less likely to occur and when is the policymaker's response likely to 
be favorable for the interest group? The present paper is a first attempt to pro- 
vide some answers to these questions in a game-theoretical analysis. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the remainder of this section, 
the present paper will be related to the literature. Section 2 presents a simple 
but basic game in which an interest group has private information (on the state 
of the world) which is relevant for the policymaker's decision. This decision 
affects the payoffs of both players, and the interest group has the possibility 
of sending a message (lobby report) to the policymaker at a fixed cost. Section 
3 presents the equilibria of the game under various sets of parameters and der- 
ives comparative statics results between, on the one hand, the occurrence of and 
the response to lobbying messages and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, 
the interest group's stake in persuading the policymaker, and the policymak- 271 
er's preferences and initial beliefs.  Section 4 discusses two extensions to the 
basic model. First, it is shown that the scope for information transfer may in- 
crease if the cost of lobbying is a decision variable for the interest group. Se- 
cond, we introduce an intermediary stage in the game, which 'screens' a mes- 
sage before it reaches the policymaker. Section 5 contains a discussion of the 
results and relates them to other, theoretical and empirical, work on interest 
groups.  Section 6 concludes. 
Relating  the  present  paper  to  the  literature,  it  is  first  noted  that  the 
predominant  formal literature on interest groups and  rent-seeking typically 
uses an influence  function  to represent the transformation of inputs by interest 
groups  (money,  labor,  and  capital)  into  political  influence  (e.g.,  Becker, 
1985; Tullock, 1980). A major criticism of these models is that the (inter)action 
underlying his transformation is lacking (cf. Mitchell,  1990). It is simply as- 
sumed that pressure is produced by spending resources. Moreover, the political 
agents are not treated as players in these models but are assumed to respond 
mechanically to  interest  groups'  pressures.  In  contrast,  in the model to be 
presented, the policymaker is treated as a player and one aspect of the interac- 
tion  is  explicitly  modelled,  to  wit,  information  transmission.  This  goes, 
however, at the cost of not incorporating any competition between interest 
groups.  In  a  sense,  the  model may be seen as  an attempt to find a  micro- 
foundation for the use and specification of an influence function. 
By using a game setting the model differs from models of persuasion (e.g., 
Bartlett,  1973;  Calvert,  1985) in which the sender of messages is not treated 
strategically (as a player). Furthermore, our model differs fromprincipal-agent 
models (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983) in that we do not assume that the unin- 
formed player (policymaker) can commit itself to a message-response profile 
at the beginning of the game. Such a commitment specifies conditional actions 
by the principal of the form: 'If yo send me report M on your private informa- 
tion, I commit myself to do X.' We do not think such commitments (contracts) 
to be relevant or credible in the context of informational lobbying. 
Being a signalling game, our model, of course, bears resemblance to the sig- 
nalling literature in general. But it differs from cheap talk games, for instance, 
in that we do not assume that communications (lobbying messages) are cost- 
less. In addition, we allow the players to have a 'substantial' difference of in- 
terests (contrary to, e.g., Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell, 1988) and we do 
not assume that lying is impossible (Milgrom,  1981). Furthermore, our basic 
model (Section 2) differs from a wide class of signalling games (so-called mono- 
tonic signalling games; see Cho and Sobel, 1990) in that we assume that the cost 
of a message is fixed, that is, independent of the content of the message (signal) 
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2. The basic model 
For a lobbying model it is difficult to write down the appropriate game form 
since the institutional setting within which lobbying takes place is rather diffuse 
and obscure. Therefore, we have deliberately chosen to start off with a lobby- 
ing game with a  'thin' institutional  structure,  but which incorporates all the 
necessary ingredients for strategic informational lobbying. There are two play- 
ers, a  policymaker (government) G  and an interest group F.  Player G  has to 
take an action x from a set of feasible actions X. The payoffs (utilities) the play- 
ers derive from x depend on some (state of the world) variable 0 ~ O, where 
O is a finite set. It is assumed that the 'true' value of 0 is private information 
of F. The variable 0 may reflect the action taken by F in response to the action 
x by G. For example, if 0 reflects the competitiveness of a firm F it may deter- 
mine the demand for labor (the reaction) by F in response to subsidies or pro- 
tection (x) provided by G. The state of the world 0, however, may also refer 
to reactions to x by other agents than F, including  'nature'. For example, an 
environmental group F may have private information on the state of nature 0, 
which determines the consequences of an environmental policy x. Or, if F  is 
a trade union, 0 may reflect the preferences of its members and, consequently, 
their voting intentions  in response to x. 
Before G decides on its action, F can send G a message (lobby report) m from 
the (finite) set of feasible messages M.  It is perhaps most natural to think of 
the set M as containing all elements of O or all subsets of O, but, as will be seen 
below, the specification of M is immaterial to the equilibrium outcomes of the 
game. We assume that sending a message bears a  fixed exogenous cost c to F 
but not to G, and that sending no message, denoted by n, bears no exogenous 
cost.1 The important assumption we make here is that this cost is independent 
of both the 'content' of the message (i.e., the particular element of M) and the 
private information 0 of F. Testifying at a congressional hearing, making a tele- 
phone call,  or hiring a  lobbyist, for instance,  bears a  cost but this cost is in- 
dependent of what F says and of what F knows. Thus, for the cost of a 'signal' 
s, we assume c(s) =  0 if s  =  n, c(s)  =  c if s  =  m  ~ M. Furthermore, we assume 
here that there is no way that G can check the accuracy of F's message. In Sec- 
tion 4 we shall discuss two alternative specifications. 
For the ease of presentation attention is focused on the case that both X and 
O contain only two elements, X  =  [x I, X2}  and O  =  {01, 02}.  Whenever the 
results depend qualitatively on this restriction, this will be indicated.  It is as- 
sumed that G  assigns a prior probability p  (1 -  p) to the case that 0  =  02 (0  = 
01) and that every element of the game except 0, which is private information 
of F, is common knowledge. Without further loss of generality we can normal- 
ize the payoffs over action-state pairs such that they can be represented by the 
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G,F  0=01  0----0 2 
x  =  x 1  al,  0  0,0 
x  =  x 2  0, b I  a 2,  b 2 
It is assumed that a i  >  0,  for i  =  1, 2.  Hence,  we can say that a i is the (net) 
payoff to G  of making the 'right' choice (xi) when the state is 0i,  and that the 
action x 2 by G  gives F  a (net) payoff of b i if its private information is 0 i. In the 
sequel,  F i will indicate  the interest  group with  private information  0i .2 
To define equilibrium  formally, we need some additional  notation.  Let tr(s) 
denote G's strategy,  defined  as the probability that G  plays x  =  x 2 after ha- 
ving received 'signal' s  (  S:  =  MU  {n}.  Let Pi(s), i  =  1, 2, denote Fi's strate- 
gy, that is, the probability that F sends signal s ~ S when its private information 
is 0  =  0 i. Finally,  q(s) denotes G's posterior belief, defined as the (subjective) 
probability  that  0  =  02  after  having  received  signal  s.  Now,  a  Lobbying 
Equilibrium (LE) is defined by a pair of strategies tr, p, satisfying the following 
conditions: 
(1) if for some s fi S, Oi(s)  >  0 then s maximizes big(s ) -  c(s); in addition ~sPi(S ) 
=  1 for i  =  1,2, 
(2) if o(s)  >  0  (<  1)  for some s  E S,  then  q(s)  ___  (<_) o~:  =  aa/(a 1  +  a2), 
(3) q(s)  =  Prob [ 0 = 021s }  =  pp2(s)/[(1 -  p)pl(S) + pp2(s)] if the denominator is 
positive;  if not,  the belief q(s) must be concentrated  on the type F i which 
is  'most likely' to send the  off-equilibrium  signal  s. 
Condition (1) states that s 6o) should maximize the expected payoff of F, taking 
the strategy of G as given. Condition (2) requires that x (a) maximes G's expect- 
ed payoff given its posterior beliefs. Condition (3) requires G's posterior beliefs 
to be consistent  with Bayes' rule, whenever possible.  In addition,  in case of a 
signal s which  is not sent in equilibrium,  beliefs must be concentrated  on the 
type which is 'most likely' (i.e., has the weakest disincentive) to deviate and to 
send s instead of the equilibrium  signal.  This latter requirement  precludes  se- 
quential  equilibria  which  are  supported  by  unintuitive  off-equilibrium 
beliefs. 3 
Now, we will motivate a  further restriction  of our focus of attention.  Three 
basic situations  or incentive structures  can be distinguished,  dependent  on the 
values of b I and b 2. Firstly, there is no conflict of interest between G  and F  if 
b 1 <  0  <  b 2.  In this case both F  and G  prefer the action x I if 0  =  01 and the 
action x 2 if 0  =  02. Hence, F never has an incentive to make a dishonest or un- 
truthful  report  on its private information.  It is easy to show that there is no 
problem regarding the scope for information transfer from F to G  in this case 
of completely congruent  interests.  There is no reason  for the policymaker to 
mistrust a message by the interest group. 4 Secondly, there is full conflict of in- 274 
terests if b 2  <  0  <  b 1.  In this case G  prefers to play X l  if 0  =  01  and x 2 if 0 
=  02, whereas F  prefers G  to play x I if 0  =  02 and x 2 if O =  01.  Hence, F  al- 
ways has an incentive to be dishonest and misinform G  about its private infor- 
mation:  F 1 would  like to make G  believe that 0  =  02,  and F 2 would  like to 
make G  believe that O =  01.  It can be shown that no scope for information 
transfer exists in this case of completely opposite preferences. Due to the ra- 
tional expectations character of the equilibrium concept, the policymaker will 
always interpret a  message in a  manner which is unfavorable for the interest 
group, and hence, no message will be sent. 5 Finally, there is a case of partial 
conflict of interest  if bl,  b E  >  0  (or,  similarly,  b 1,  b E  <  0).  In this  case F 
prefers G  to play x 2 independent  of its private information. Consequently,  F 
always has an incentive to make G belief that 0  =  02. Hence, F 2 would like to 
report truthfully on its private information whereas F 1 has an incentive to mis- 
inform G about its private information. The problem of the scope for informa- 
tion transfer and the rationale for sending costly messages is most pertinent in 
this case of partly conflicting interests. Therefore, we shall concentrate on this 
case and assume henceforth that, 
b i  >  0, i  =  1,2. 
To illustrate this set-up, consider the following example. Let 0 denote the com- 
petitiveness of a firm (or industry) F, which can either be low (02) or high (01). 
The government  G  has to  decide  whether  (x2)  or  not  (Xl)  to  give in  to  F's 
preference (b  i  >  0) for an infrastructural project. G  prefers to give in to this 
demand if and only if 0  =  02. This may be due to the costs (0- a2) to G of the 
substantial loss of employment which will ensue (only) if G  does not provide 
the project when F's competitiveness is low (02).  If 0  =  01  then F's competi- 
tiveness is too high to warrant the (social) costs of the project (a 1 >  0). 
3. Equilibrium 
First,  it will  be shown  -  proofs are in the Appendix  -  that in equilibrium 
different messages cannot induce different actions,  as we have stated in the 
previous section. As a consequence, the specification of the message space M, 
is immaterial to the outcomes of the game. 
Lemma. Every message m  E M  which is sent with positive probability induces 
the same action. 
The intuition behind this result is the following.  Once F  has decided to send 
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what it is going to say. After this decision, a message is essentially equivalent to 
'cheap talk'. Thus, if the content of a message would make a difference for G's 
action, F will always send a message with the most favorable impact on G's ac- 
tion. All messages which are sent in equilibrium must induce the same, most 
favorable (mixed) action by G. The Lemma can be interpreted as saying that 
it is not the content of a  message as such that reveals information to G, but 
merely the fact that a message is being received (or not). Consequently, nothing 
is lost in terms of equilibrium actions and payoffs if we henceforth assume that 
the set of feasible messages M  contains only one element, m ° say. Although 
the content of a message does not really matter (cf. Crawford and Sobel, 1982) 
we could think  of m °  as saying that  '0  =  02.'  To simplify notation,  we can 
now define:  Oi:  =  oi(m °) and  1 -Pi  =  Oi  (n),  for i  =  1, 2. 
The next proposition indicates that no information transfer can occur if the 
interest group's preferences carry information in the 'wrong direction'. As a 
consequence,  G  will base its decision on its prior belief p. 
Proposition 1.  If b 1 >  b 2  >  0 then oi  =  0,  i  =  1, 2,  and a(n)  =  o(q(n))  = 
o(p) in any LE. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Only if 0  =  0 2,  F would want to 
reveal its private information because then G  is willing to play x 2.  However, 
if b 1 >  b 2 then F 1 has a larger stake in persuading G  that 0  =  0  2 than F 2.  In 
other words, when F wants to report honestly (F2) it has a smaller stake to send 
a message than when it wants to report dishonestly. From G's perspective, the 
'bad' type is more willing to invest in a  persuasive message than the  'good' 
type. Knowing this,  G  is tempted to interpret  a  message as coming from F l 
rather than  F 2.  From F's perspective,  however,  this  would  be unfavorable. 
Consequently,  F  will not send a  costly message. 
Hence,  a  necessary condition  for informative messages is:  b 1  >  b 2.  This 
sorting condition  -  which is not new in the signalling literature  -  in a  sense 
requires  that  there  is  'sufficient'  congruence  of  preferences  between  the 
policymaker  and  the  interest  group.  More  specifically,  it  implies  that  F's 
preferences carry information in the 'right direction'; F's stake in persuading 
is larger when its private information is of the kind that justifies persuasion 
from G's point of view. 
Another necessary condition for the occurrence of lobbying is that b 2 >  c. 
If the cost of a message is prohibitive (b 1 <  b 2 <  c) then obviously no lobby- 
ing can occur in equilibrium and G  will base its decision on its prior beliefs. 
To enable the occurrence of lobbying it is, henceforth,  assumed that, 
0  <  b I  <  b 2 and c  <  b 2. 276 
The next two propositions present the equilibria of the game under the latter 
assumption.  An important  distinction  that must be made is between the case 
that the cost of sending a message is prohibitive for F 1 (b 1 <  c) and the case that 
it is not (b 1 >  c). Not surprisingly,  a  further distinction must be made between 
the  case (p  >  a  =  al/[a 1  +  a2] )  where,  on the  basis of its prior beliefs,  G 
would take the action (x2) which is preferred by F  and the case (p  <  ~) where 
G  would take a  decision (Xl) unfavorable to F.  We start with the latter case. 6 
Proposition 2 
If p  <  a  there is a  unique  LE, 
(a) ifc  <  b 1 <  b2: 
LEI: Pl  =  p(1-o0/[(1-p)a],  02  =  1,  a(n)  =  0,  a(m °)  =  C/bl; 
(b) if b 1 <  c  <  b2: 
LE2:01  =  0, 02  =  1,  a(n)  =  0,  a(m*)  =  1. 
The  equilibrium  exhibits  the  following  qualitative  properties.  [Comparative 
statics will be discussed later.] If lobbying cost are prohibitive for type F 1 (case 
b), then only F 2 sends a message which then is conclusive evidence that 0  =  02. 
If cost are not prohibitive (case a) then F 2 always sends a  report and F 1 plays 
a  mixed strategy.  The rationale for this is as follows.  G  will play x 2 only if its 
belief  -  that  0  =  0  z  -  increases.  This belief will be increased  by a  message 
only if a  message is more likely to come from F 2 than from F 1. Therefore,  F 1 
must play a  mixed strategy. Although  a message is informative in this case, G 
still remains in doubt about 0 after a message since both Pl and Pz are positive. 
Thus uncertainty  (specifically q(m °)  =  ~) induces G  to play a mixed strategy, 
and  this  strategy in turn  justifies  Fl'S mixed  strategy.  No  message  (silence), 
however, is conclusive evidence that 0  =  01.  In this case G  takes the same ac- 
tion (xl) as it would have taken on the basis of its prior beliefs (p).  We could 
say that in LE1  'silence is consent'. 
Proposition 3 
If p  >  a,  there are multiple  LE, 
(a) if c  <  b 1  <  b 2" 
LE3:Oa  =  02  =  0,  o(n)  =  1,  a(m °)  =  1 
LE4:Ol  =  0,02  =  1  -  (1-p)~x/[p(1-c0L  a(n)  =  1-c/bz,  a(m*)  =  1 
LE5:01  =  02  =  1,  a(n)  =  0,  a(m °)  =  1; 
(b) if b 1  <  c  <  b 2"  LE2  and  LE3. 
We see that no-lobbying  (LE3) is always a  LE if G's prior beliefs (p  >  o~) are 
already favorable for F's preference  (x2).  There is no need to send a  message 
for F in LE3 since G  does not expect a message and will make a favorable deci- 277 
sion anyhow.  Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly,  there are also equili- 
bria in which a  message is being sent.  In LE4,  only F 2 sends a  message with 
positive probability and, hence, a message is conclusive evidence that 0  =  02. 
However, the probability o(n), that G concedes to F's wishes if no message is 
being received, is so large (blO(n) >  blO(m °) -c) that it does not pay for F 1 to 
send a message. In LE5, G expects to receive a message with probability one. 
If G  would not receive a  message it will argue that it is most likely that 0  = 
01, since in this state F benefits less (b 1 <  b2) from the sure concession (o(m °) 
=  1) after a  message. Consequently, after the out-off-equilibrium signal s  = 
n, G would update to q(n)  =  0 and play o(n)  =  0. Due to these (posterior) be- 
liefs and the corresponding strategy of G, F is 'forced' to send a costly message 
(independent of its private information), even though such a message does not 
convey any information (q(m*)  =  p). Finally, note that in LE2, LE4 and LE5, 
G takes a (mixed) action, if it does not receive a message, which is less favorable 
for F than the action which G would take on the basis of its prior beliefs [a(n) 
=  o(q(n))  <  o(p)  =  1].  Rather than 'silence is consent', a more appropriate 
proverb for this result would be 'no news is bad news' (cf. Milgrom,  1981), or 
even better 'silence is bad news'. Hence, if F is not certain that the equilibrium 
which will be played is LE3, then it will have to send a message if it wants to 
be sure that G  will play x 2. 
Now we shall make some payoff comparisons.  Let E G, E l, and E 2 denote 
the expected payoffs of G, F 1, and F 2, respectively. Simple computation rev- 
eals that, 
EG(LE1)  =  (1- p)a l, EG(LE2)  =  (1- p)a I  +  pa  2, EG(LE3)  =  EG(LE4)  = 
EG(LE5 )  =  Pa2; 
El(LE D  =  EI(LE2)  =  0, El(LE3)  =  b 1, EI(LE4)  =  bl(1 -c/b2), EI(LE5) 
=  b I -  c; 
E2(LE1 )  =  c(b2/b 1- 1),  E2(LE2  )  =  b2-c,  E2(LE3)  =  b 2,  Ez(LE4)  = 
b 2-c,Ez(LE5 )  =  b 2-c. 
We  see that  G  attains  the  maximum feasible  expected payoff (only)  in the 
separating equilibrium  LE2.  This equilibrium exists if b I  <  c  <  b2 .7 In the 
other equilibria G's expected payoffs are identical to the expected payoffs in 
the case where G would base its decision on its prior belief p, that is, (1 -  p)a 1 
if p  <  o~, and pa  2 if p  >  a. This is a straightforward result for the equilibria 
LE3 and LE5, since no information is disclosed in these pooling equilibria (Pl 
=  02).  For LE1 and LE4, however, this result is less straightforward because 
in these semi-pooling equilibria 'some' information is being transmitted ~o 1 ;~ 
02). 8 Note,  however,  that  G  may be misled by F's signal.  In LEI  there is a 
chance  -  (1 -p)01a(m °)  -  that G  'wrongly' decides to play x 2,  and in LE4 
there is a  chance  -  p(1 -02)(1 -a(m°))  -  that G  wrongly decides to play x 1. 278 
Nevertheless, in terms of expected payoffs, G does not lose from F's (possibili- 
ty of sending a) message in any LE. 
The interest group (both F 1 and F2) may either lose or benefit from the pos- 
sibility of sending a message. If G  would base its decision on its prior belief, 
then both F 1 and F 2 would receive a payoff of 0 in the case that p  <  oL. Hence, 
in terms of expected payoffs F 2 strictly benefits from the possibility of sending 
a message in this case and F 1 'breaks even' (LE1 and LE2). Ex post, of course, 
F may regret to have sent a costly message -  namely, when G nevertheless plays 
x 1 (which happens with probability 1 -  ~(m*)). If p  >  a, then both F 1 and F 2 
attain the maximum feasible payoff if lobbying were impossible and G  would 
base its decision on its prior belief. Hence, in this case both F 1 and F 2, either 
lose from the possibility of sending a  message (LE2,  LE4,  LE5)  or,  at best, 
break even (LE3). 9 
Summarizing, we can say that in some cases (LE2) both the policymaker and 
the interest group benefit from the costs invested in a  lobbying message, but 
that in other cases (LE5) the costs invested in informational lobbying are a pure 
social waste. 
Now, we shall relate the analysis to the questions  posed in the introduction, 
concerning the scope for information transfer and the rationale for lobbying. 
First, we have seen that an opportunity for information transfer exists -  even 
in a situation where there is a partial conflict of interests and where lobbying 
costs are independent of both the content of the message and the private infor- 
mation of the sender -  if the interest group's preferences carry information in 
the 'right direction' (b I  <  b2), that is, if F has a larger stake in persuading G 
when it wants to inform (F2) than when it wants to misinform (F1). Although 
the assumption b 1 <  b 2 may seem arbitrary, we belief that (empirically) it is 
a  more relevant case than b I  >  b 2.  Remember that G  is willing to give in to 
F's demand  for x 2 only if 0  =  0  2  .  If b 1 <  b 2 then 0  2 is also the case that F 
benefits most from G's concession (x2). Hence, b 1 <  b 2 in a sense implies that 
G  is willing to give in to F's claim only in the case that F  wants or 'needs' a 
concession most. 1° 
Second, from the interest group's perspective, a rationale for costly lobbying 
exists (a) if it induces a favorable change in the policymaker's behavior relative 
to the latter's propensity based on its prior beliefs (Proposition 2, LE1, LE2), 
and (b) if F knows or believes that G expects to receive a lobbying message and 
will make a less favorable decision in case of silence (Proposition 3, LE2, LE4, 
LE5). As a consequence, a lobbying message may in some situations provide 
a real service to the policymaker and the interest group (LE2), but may be a 
pure social waste in others (LE5). 
In addition, the following comparative statics can be inferred from the anal- 
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(Proposition 3). First, note that in Proposition 2 (p  <  o~) the expected occur- 
rence of lobbying O, defined as O:  =  (1 -P)Pl  +  PP2, is non-decreasing in b l 
and non-increasing in c, due to the fact that we can switch from regime (a) to 
regime (b). Moreover, if b E decreases or c increases we eventually end up in the 
case where b 2 <  c and lobbying costs are prohibitive. Hence, a quite intuitive 
result is that lobbying is more likely to occur if the cost decreases and/or if the 
potential benefit or stake increases. Furthermore, an easy calculation reveals 
that O  =  p/ct in equilibrium LE1 (c <  b 1 <  bE). This suggests that lobbying 
is more likely to occur if G is closer (due to a higher p/o0 to the regime (p/a 
>  l) in which, on the basis of its prior beliefs, G would make the decision (x2) 
which is preferred by F. The rationale is that with larger p/a, G can be induced 
to play x 2 with a smaller increase (q(m °) -  p) in its belief. A message need not 
'surprise' G so much, and hence, F 1 can send a message with a larger probabil- 
ity. However, the relation between O and p/a is not necessarily monotonous, 
because an  increase in  p/a  eventually leads  to a  jump  from the  regime of 
Proposition 2 (p/tx <  1) to the regime of Proposition 3 (p/o~  >  1), and in this 
latter regime there are two equilibria (LE3 and LE4) where O  is smaller than 
in LE1  (but also one, LE5, where O  is larger). 
A  second  endogenous  variable  that  is  of  interest  is  the  policymaker's 
response to lobbying, a(m°). From proposition 2 we can infer that a(m 0) is in- 
creasing in c and decreasing in b I.  We could say that G  'discounts'  F's mes- 
sage, depending on the stake which F 1 has to misinform G, relative to the cost 
of a message. In the limiting case where messages are costless (c =  0) it follows 
that a(m °)  =  0 and G  takes the same action (xl) it would have taken on the 
basis of its prior beliefs.11 Furthermore, focussing again on the regime c  <  b 1 
<  b 2, we see that o(m*)  <  1 if p  <  t~ (LE1), whereas, or(m*)  =  1 if p  >  c~ 
(LE3, LE4, and LE5). Thus, if we switch from p/a  <  1 to p/o~  >  1,  a(m °) 
increases. Hence, a(m 0) is non-decreasing in p/o~. We can say that G's response 
to lobbying is more favorable for F, if G would already have made ('tended' 
to make) this favorable decision on the basis of its prior beliefs. 
4. Additional validating mechanisms 
In this section, two extensions of the basic model of the previous sections will 
shortly be discussed. First, we shall treat a model in which the cost of lobbying 
is endogenous. Second, a model is presented in which the content of the lobby- 
ing message matters, in the sense that 'true' messages are more likely to be ac- 
cepted than 'false' messages. Both of these extensions will be seen to increase 
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4.1. Endogenous lobbying costs 
In the basic model it is assumed that the cost of sending a message is fixed. The 
idea is that this cost is determined exogenously by the communication channel 
used by the interest group to put forward its message (e.g., paying a personal 
visit, writing a letter, testifying at a hearing), and that this cost is independent 
of the content of the message and the private information of the interest group. 
However, to some degree the cost of lobbying may be endogenous to the in- 
terest group. For instance, by paying more visits, writing more letters, having 
more subscribers to a  petition,  hiring more lobbyists, or by placing more or 
larger advertisements, an interest group can to some extent vary the cost of a 
message. It follows that even if the costs to an interest group are independent 
of the content  of the message and its private information,  an interest group 
with 'favorable' private information could try to increase the persuasiveness 
of its message by increasing the cost (or effort) of its message. 
To illustrate the consequences we amend the basic model as follows. Recall 
that, independent of its private information, F has a stake in making G belief 
that 0  =  02.  Therefore, we fix the  'content' of a  message as saying that '0 is 
(likely to be) 02', and we assume that the cost of signalling -  that is, to send 
the message at a particular cost -  can be varied continuously. For simplicity, 
it will be assumed with respect to these costs, denoted by c(s), that c(s)  =  s, 
where s now denotes the cost (effort) which F chooses to invest in the message, 
instead of the content of the signal as in the basic model. If s  =  0 then F does 
not make any cost, which means that it does not send the message. It is allowed, 
furthermore,  that  there  is  some  upperbound  s +  on  the  costs  which  F  can 
make. This bound may be caused by budgetary restrictions,  or to limitations 
imposed by the communication channel.  Hence, we assume that s ~ S:  =  [0, 
s+]. The strategy Pi(s), i  =  1, 2, now denotes the probability that F i makes a 
cost s (=  c(s)) in sending the message that 0  =  02. An equilibrium is again de- 
fined by the conditions (1)-(3) from Section 2.12 For brevity we shall only give 
the equilibrium  for the case (p  <  o~) that,  on the basis of its prior beliefs, G 
tends to take a  decision (x 1) which is unfavorable for F. 
Proposition 4 
If p  <  a, 0  <  b I  <  b 2 the following is a  LE: 
(a) if s +  <  bl: Pl(S +)  =  1-Pl(O  )  =  p(1-oO/[(1-p)a],P2(s +)  =  1, a(s)  =  0 
for s  <  s +, a(s +)  =  s+/bl; 
(b) if s +  >  bl: Pl(0)  =  1, p2(bl)  =  1, o(s)  =  0 for s  <  b 1, a(s)  =  1 for s  _> 
b 1  • 
Case (b) shows that perfect revelation of information (a separating equilibri- 
um) is possible if the maximum feasible cost s +  which can be invested in the 281 
message is large enough. In this case the type (F2) with the favorable informa- 
tion makes just so much cost (s  =  bl) that it does not pay for the type with 
the bad information (F 1) to follow. Hence, with F 1 not making any costs (not 
sending a message), F's private information is completely revealed and G  acts 
accordingly: it plays x 2 if and only if the message sent by F  bears a  cost to F 
of at least b 1. 
In case (a) the upperbound on the cost of a message is too tight to allow for 
complete separation. Even if F 2 invests maximally (s  =  s +) in its message with 
probability one, it pays for F 1 to follow if this induces a  favorable change in 
G's behavior.  This  change,  however,  will  occur only if F 1 (contrary to  F 2) 
plays a  mixed strategy,  since then  a  message with cost s +  is more likely to 
come from F 2. 
Although  the  equilibrium  of Proposition  4  is  very similar  to  the  one  of 
Proposition 2 if s +  =  c, case (b) is different.  The reason is that F 2 will not 
(have to) spend more on lobbying than b 1 to compete out F 1 if s +  >  b 1. In ad- 
dition,  lobbying costs cannot be prohibitive now; contrary to c  >  b 2 in Sec- 
tion 2, s +  >  b 2 does not prohibit F 2 to send a message. Consequently, as sim- 
ple payoff comparisons reveal, if s +  >  c then both G and F 2 are better off in 
the  LE of Proposition  4  than  in the LE of Proposition  2,  whereas F 1 is in- 
different. Hence, in ex ante terms both the policymaker and the interest group 
benefit from the fact that there is no restriction on the effort or cost that can 
be invested in sending a  message. 
It is worth noting that the scope for information transfer also increases if the 
interest  group's  cost  of  sending  a  message  is  a  decision  variable  of  the 
policymaker.  Recall  from  Section  3  that  G  attains  the  maximum  feasible 
payoff in equilibrium LE2, which exists if c lies between b 1 and b 2. If G would 
have the possibility to vary c  -  for instance, by being more or less accessible 
and hospitable for messages -  then G would have an incentive to set c between 
b 1 and b 2. In that case, G should increase the cost of lobbying if F potentially 
(i.e., if 0  =  01)  has a  high stake (b 1) to misinform G. 13 
4.2.  Screening of messages 
In the analysis of Section 3, the content of the message appeared not to have 
any impact on the equilibrium outcome. This is due to the assumption that the 
policymaker cannot,  in any way, distinguish  between  'false' and  'true' mes- 
sages. Although this is a quite common assumption in signalling models, and 
an interesting one as a benchmark case, it is, of course, a quite extreme assump- 
tion. There may be mechanisms or institutions which provide some screening 
of (the content of) messages. For instance, an interest group may try to make 
its case ('0 =  02,' in our game) more credible by employing (at a cost c) outside 282 
consultants  or experts.  Although  there is often  pressure  (either  direct  or im- 
plicit) on the consultant to produce a report which supports the case of the in- 
terest group, this does not imply that the consultant will always deliberately lie 
if this favors the interest group's case (there may be a loss of credibility for the 
consultant at stake). It could be argued that the probability that the consultant 
comes up with a  report that favors the interest  group (i.e.,  saying '0  =  02') is 
more likely when the true state is favorable for the group's case (0  =  02) than 
when it is not (0  =  01). However, if the consultant  turns up with a  report that 
harms  the  group's  case (i.e.,  a  report  saying that  '0  =  01') then the  interest 
group will not transmit this report (message) to the policymakers.  It will only 
transmit the consultant's  findings if they are favorable (i.e.,  support 02).  In a 
sense, the interest group 'screens' the reports produced by outside ('objective') 
consultants.  We shall now illustrate that this mechanism can increase the scope 
for  information  transfer  and  the  impact  of messages  on  the  policymaker's 
action. 
Let a-  i, i  =  1, 2, denote the exogenous  (and commonly known) probability 
that the consultant  turns  up with a  report saying  '0  =  02' when  actually 0  = 
0i, and assume that 0  _<  71"  1  --<  71"  2  ~  1. NOW, Pi denotes the probability that F i 
hires a  consultant  at a  fixed cost c.  Instead of condition  (1), Pi  ~  0,  now re- 
quires that Iribi[o(m)- o(n)]  -  c  _>  0. Furthermore,  if G  receives a message (s 
--  m) saying that '0  =  02', then the posterior probability q(m) that 0  =  02 is: 
q(m)  =  pp271"2/[(1 -p)plTrl  +  ppETr2  ].  If G  does not receive a  message (s  =  n) 
then there is a  probability (1 -p)(1-01)  +  p(1-02)  that F  did not hire a con- 
sultant,  and,  a  probability  (1 -  p)ol(l -  7rl)  +  pp2(1 -  7r2) that  the  consultant 
turned  up  with  a  report  (saying  '0  =  01')  which  F  did  not  transmit  to  G. 
Hence,  the  posterior  probability that 0  =  02 when no message is received is: 
q(n)  =  p(1 -027r2)/[(1- p)(1- olTrl)  +  p(1-  P27r2)].  In the following illustra- 
tion of the increased scope for information transmission we shall, for brevity's 
sake,  again restrict  attention  to the  -  more interesting  -  case that p  <  a. 
Proposition  5 
If p  <  or, the  following  is a  LE: 
(a) if c  <  7rib 1 <  7r2b  2 then 
(i) if/3  <  l:pl  =  /3,02  =  1,  o(n)  =  0,  a(m)  =  c/0rlbl); 
(ii) if/3  _>  1:  Pl  =  P2  =  1,  o(n)  =  0,o(m)  =  1; 
where 3:  =  7r2P(1 -- ot)/['Xl(l -- p)ot]; 
(b)  if  ~-1bl  <  c  <  7r2b  2  then  01  =  O,  02  =  1,  o(n)  =  0,  o(m)  =  1. 
Case (b) is similar to Proposition  2(b).  If for type F 1 the sure cost exceeds the 
maximum potential gain (c  >  7qb 1) then it will not hire a consultant.  Further- 
more, the (intuition behind the) result of part (ai) is similar to the one of Propo- 
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Note first that the ratio 71"2/71"  l  in fact measures the (perceived) reliability or 
reputation of the consultant. In the limiting case that 7I"  2  =  1 and 7r  1 =  0, the 
consultant is perfectly reliable. This agent will always find out and report the 
true state. Type F l, however, will not hire a costly consultant in this limiting 
case which is equivalent to regime (b) were we have perfect revelation of infor- 
mation (provided that 7fEb  2 >  c). In case (aii) the cost of hiring a consultant 
is not prohibitive for F 1 (c  <  7rlbl)  and at the same time 71"2/71"  1 is relatively 
large  (such that  ~  >__  1).  In  this  case both types hire  a  consultant  and  the 
policymaker plays x 2 if and only if it receives a message. A  noteworthy corol- 
lary of this result is that even costless messages (c  =  0) can now induce G to 
play  x 2  if there is sufficient confidence in the consultant (~  _>  1).14 Further- 
more, if c  <  b 1, we are in regime (a) of Proposition 2, but due to 71 1 (  1, we 
may be in regime (b) of Proposition 5, where we have a separating equilibrium 
(provided that c  <  7rEb2). These facts illustrate the increased scope for infor- 
mation transfer, in comparison to the basic model. Moreover, a comparison 
between a(m*) in Proposition 2 and a(m) in Proposition 5, reveals the increased 
impact of a  message on the policymaker's action. 
Similar results can be derived if the content of a report or message is being 
'screened' after it has been sent (made public) by an interest group. There may 
be situations where a message by an interest group (saying that 0  =  02) does 
not directly reach a  policymaker but  first passes  one or more intermediary 
agents.  For instance,  messages  may (have to)  pass  bureaucrats,  the  media, 
opinion  leaders,  or  congressional  staff  members  before  they  reach  a 
policymaker or legislator. These agents often do not just mechanically transmit 
the message but give an opinion on the content of the message (agree/disagree; 
likely to be true/false). Hence, before the policymaker receives a  subjective 
report by an interest group, there is often an 'objective' opinion attached to 
it. Although a policymaker is not likely to fare blindly on these opinions -  for 
one thing, they may also be motivated by self-interest -  it may be the case that 
they are considered to be reliable to 'some extent' (indicated by 7r2/Tq).  It can 
be shown  formally that  the  existence of such  an  ('objective') intermediary 
screening stage, increases the scope for information transfer and the impact of 
messages sent by interest groups in much the same way as in Proposition 5.15 
5.  Discussion 
In this  section we  shall  relate our results  to some  (of the  scarce) empirical 
studies on lobbying, and to some theoretical hypotheses that have been put for- 
ward in the literature on interest groups. In addition, we shall give some sugges- 
tions for further research. 
First, we consider the (expected) occurrence of informational lobbying.  An 284 
intuitively plausible result from Section 3 is that lobbying is more likely to oc- 
cur when it cost (c) decreases and the stake (bi) increases. However, we do not 
know of any empirical studies that directly address this relationship. 16 A rela- 
tionship which has been addressed in empirical studies, is between the occur- 
rence of lobbying and the congruence of the players' interests and views. The 
general finding is that lobbyists tend to address their efforts and messages to 
legislators and policymakers which are 'friends' and which are 'on their own 
side' (Bauer et al., 1963: Parts IV and V; see also Berry, 1977; Zeigler and Baer, 
1969). This observation gives partial but not  full theoretical support to our 
model.  First,  we could  say that  in  our model the interest group  F  and  the 
policymaker G are 'friends' if the former has an incentive to report truthfully 
on its private information, but not if F has an incentive to misinform or conceal 
its private information. Defined this way, F 2 is a friend of G, but F 1 is not. In 
any of the equilibria of Sections 3 and 4, it holds that Pl  -< P2" This is support- 
ed by the empirical observation that lobbying reports are more likely to come 
from friends. There is, however, a second, alternative way to define 'friendli- 
ness' in the relationship between F and G. We could say that there is more con- 
gruence of preferences between G  and F if o~  =  al/[a 1 +  a 2] decreases, since 
then G  is more inclined or tempted to take the action (x2) which is preferred 
by F (both F 1 and F2). And, indeed, as we saw in Proposition 2 (LE1), the ex- 
pected occurrence of lobbying O is decreasing in ot (and increasing in p), finding 
support by the empirical observation. Recall from Section 3, however, that this 
relation is not necessarily monotonic, since with decreases in a  we might jump 
from the regime of Proposition 2 (p  <  a) to the regime of Proposition 3 (p > 
o0, where O is higher in LE5 but lower in LE3 and LE4. If LE3 were selected 
then the relation between O  and a  is non-monotonic: O decreases with a  if p 
<  or, but falls to zero if a  becomes smaller than p. The relation between O and 
ct is unambiguously negative (non-positive) -  supporting the observation by 
Bauer et al.  (1963)  -  only if LE5 is selected in the regime of Proposition 3. 
Thus, summarizing, our model gives a partial but not full theoretical explana- 
tion of the observation that lobbyists tend to turn to policymakers which have 
similar interests and already hold a  favorable view. 17 
Second,  we  consider the  policymaker's response  to  lobbying,  a(m).  One 
result from Section 3 is that G  is more likely to be persuaded (to play x2) by 
a message if G is already tempted to do so on the basis of its prior beliefs (p/o~ 
>  1). This is roughly consistent with the observation 'that the lobbyist becomes 
in effect a  service bureau for those congressman already agreeing with him, 
rather than an agent of direct persuasion' (Bauer et al., 1963: 353). In addition, 
as Berry (1977: 217) puts it, '[b]ecause lobbyists tend to talk to people who al- 
ready agree with them it seems incongruous that such high percentages of pub- 
lic and private interest lobbyists feel that it is such an effective activity'. 18 
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'discount' F's message depending on the stake which F has to persuade G, rela- 
tive to the cost of lobbying. This is consistent with the last part of Gross's 
(1972: 269) assertion that communications may be 'extremely influential -  par- 
ticularly when there is confidence in the wisdom or disinterestedness of the 
proposers or advisers'. It is, furthermore, in line with the observation that the 
cost or trouble of writing letters is positively related to their impact on legisla- 
tors (Bauer et al.,  1963): 439; Berry, 1977: 234). Further tentative support for 
the positive relationship between the cost of lobbying messages and its impact 
can be found in Van der Putten (1980). After a thorough investigation of the 
realization of some important policies in the Netherlands, he concludes (inter 
alia) that reports from official advisory councils had a negligible impact on the 
policy process, whereas messages and reports from unofficial advisers did have 
a substantial impact on the policy process, especially in those cases where they 
were not invited by policymakers to give advice. Since official advisory coun- 
cils  have easy access to policymakers and  are  often even invited to  send  a 
report, they seem to bear a lower cost of sending a message than the agents and 
interest groups which have to proceed on their own initiative in putting their 
uninvited messages across to policymakers. Therefore, the higher costs of the 
latter  type  of messages  could  be  (part  of)  an  explanation  of their  greater 
impact. 19 
Finally, we shall relate our results to the influence function,  which is often 
used to model interest group competition (e.g., Becker, 1983; Tullock, 1980). 
In these models it is assumed that influence is produced by spending resources. 
However, (a) it is not modelled on what these resources are being spent, and 
(b) it is not explained why these spendings should elicit a  favorable response 
from  the  policymaker.  Our  model  gives  at  least  a  partial  rationalization. 
Resources might be spent on lobbying messages (e.g., reports, letters, personal 
visits, hearings), and they elicit a favorable response because private informa- 
tion of the interest group is transmitted by these spendings.  Our model indi- 
cates that information may be transmitted by messages independent of the con- 
tent of the message and even if policymaker cannot check the accuracy of the 
message. This is, of course, only one way of resource-spending to produce in- 
fluence -  alternative ways are campaign contributions (Aranson and Hinich, 
1979; Austin-Smith,  1987) and the use of punishments and rewards (Aumann 
and Kurz, 1977; Potters and Van Winden,  1990) -, but it is often asserted to 
be an important one. 2° Moreover, our model at least partially explains the em- 
pirical finding that more letters (Schneider and Naumann,  1982) or more per- 
sonal visits (Zeigler and Baer, 1969: 97) produce a more favorable response by 
legislators. Repeated communication is more costly to the interest group and 
higher costs elicit a more favorable response (Propositions 2 and 4) because pri- 
vate information is signalled more persuasively. Even if the content of the mes- 
sage is always the same, frappez, frappez toujours may indeed be rational and 
effective (cf. Stekelenburg,  1988:  55). 286 
We close this section with some points of critique concerning the institution- 
ally simple set-up of the model,  and  some suggestions  for further analysis. 
Most important perhaps, is the assumption that there is no penalty on lying. 
One way such a penalty could come about is through a loss of credibility or 
reputation. Studies of lobbying stress that in an ongoing relationship "credibil- 
ity comes first" (Berry, 1984:119) and that a  "reputation for being credible 
and trustworthy is especially critical for those organizations whose representa- 
tives have direct contact with government officials" (Schlozman and Tierney, 
1986:  103).  Perhaps  the  most  natural  way to  incorporate this  feature is  to 
model the interaction as a repeated game. An interest group may then be forced 
to report truthfully in cases where it would find this unprofitable in a one shot 
interaction (cf. Sobel,  1985). 
A second point we want to mention is that in our model the interest group, 
if it wants to influence the policymaker's action, can only choose to send a mes- 
sage.  It would be interesting to extend the action space of the interest group 
and allow it to spend its resources on other channels of (potential) influence 
like campaign contributions and the use of (positive and negative) sanctions. 
A final point we would like to raise is that in our model there is only one interest 
group. There are situations where reports made by one interest group can be 
contradicted or affirmed by messages from another interest group. It would be 
interesting to see how the scope for informational lobbying is affected by the 
presence of more, potentially competing or colluding, interest groups. 21 
6. Concluding  remarks 
We have seen that lobbying messages from an interest group to a policymaker 
may be informative even if there is a substantial conflict of interest -  that is, 
if the group's preference ordering, contrary to the policymaker's, is indepen- 
dent of the state of the world -, and even if the cost of a message is independent 
of both what the interest group reports and what it knows. The ground for in- 
formation tranfer in such a setting is that an interest group with 'good' infor- 
mation to some extent distinguishes itself from the one with 'bad' information, 
where 'good' aiad 'bad' refer to whether the interest group wants to inform or 
misinform the policymaker. We have seen that such a distinction may be due 
to the fact that the good type ('friend') has a  larger stake in persuading the 
policymaker than the bad type ('foe'). In some sense, one can say that there 
is  scope  for informational lobbying if there is  sufficient congruence in the 
preferences of the players. Even then, however, it need not to be the content 
of the message as such that transmits information, but merely the fact that a 
message is being received. 
Moreover, we have shown that, even if the interest group's message does not 287 
convey any information  at all, it may  still choose to send a  message if it knows 
or thinks that the policymaker  is expecting a  message, and will interpret silence 
as  bad  news.  As  a  consequence,  a  costly  lobbying  message  provides  a  real 
benefit to the policymaker  and the interest group  in some cases, but is a  (social) 
waste  in others. 
From  the comparative  statics analysis it appeared,  inter alia, (a) that lobby- 
ing messages are more  likely to occur if the interest group  has 'good'  informa- 
tion, and  if the costs of a  message  are small relative to the potential  benefits, 
and (b) that the policymaker  is more  likely to respond  favorably to the message 
if it already tended  to do so on the basis of its prior beliefs and if the group's 
incentive to  lobby  is relatively  weak.  It was  shown  that,  by and  large,  these 
results are in line with empirical observations.  Moreover,  it was argued that our 
analysis may  give  some  microfoundation  for the use  and  specification  of the 
influence function  which  is  often  used  in  interest  group  and  rent-seeking 
models. 
Notes 
1. We could assume that a message sent by F bears a fixed cost to G as well. Provided that G 
cannot refuse to receive messages, this does not affect the equilibrium strategies. Of course, 
it would affect G's equilibrium payoffs. See also note 13, below. 
2. We do not allow for side payments,  that is, we do not allow F to make direct (monetary) trans- 
fers to G in order to induce (bribe) G to take action x 2. 
3. This latter restriction requires the sequential equilibrium to be consistent with the refinements 
of D1, Universal Divinity,  or elimination of Never Weak Best Responses, which all have the 
same power in our model (see, e.g., Cho and Sobel,  1990). 
4. Define mi:  =  '0  =  0i'.  It is easy to check that pl(n)  =  1, p2(m2)  =  1, a(n)  =  0, tr(m2) =  1 
is a LE if b E >  c, and that pl(ml)  =  1, p2(n) =  1, o(n) =  1, o(ml) =  0 is a LE if -b I  >  c. 
Moreover, pl(ml)=  l, P2(m2)=  l,o(ml)=  0, tr(m2)=  l,-c/b  I  _< o(n)_<  1-c/b 2 is aLE 
if -c/b I  +  c/b  E <  1. 
5. Assume to the contrary that pl(m) >  0 for some m  E M. This can only be optimal for F I if 
bltr(m)-c >_ big(n), which in turn requires that tr(m)  >  tr(n). As a consequence, by b E <  0, 
F 2 will not send m: a2(m)  =  0. Now, by Bayes' rule, it follows that m is conclusive evidence 
that 0 =  0t: q(m) =  0. Consequently, G will play a(m) =  0, which contradicts o(m) >  a(n). 
In a similar manner, a contradiction can be derived by assuming that pE(m) >  0 for some m 
EM. 
6. Here, and in the sequel, we disregard 'knife-edge' cases, such as b I  =  b 2  and p  =  c~. 
7  The result that complete separation with fixed cost messages is possible is due to the assump- 
tion that O  =  [0 l, 02}. If O contains more than two or an infinite number of elements, then 
the only LE which involves information transfer is a partition equilibrium of size two, where 
the F types separate in two groups. One group of types (with 'good' information) does send 
a message, whereas the other group (with 'bad' information) does not (see Potters, 1990). Of 
course, with only two types a partition equilibrium of size two is a separating equilibrium. 
8. This result, however, is due to the assumption that X  =  [xp x2), entailing that 'small' im- 
provements of information do not induce G to take different action. If we would, instead, have 288 
assumed that X  =  [x  1, x2] then G  would strictly benefit from the information transmitted in 
equilibria LE1  and LE4 (but less than in the separating equilibrium LE2). 
9. The existence of multiple equilibria -  which is not due to the assumption that X and O contain 
only two elements -  is quite common in games with asymmetric information, and it is hardly 
possible to say which of the equilibria is the more reasonable one on the basis of positive- 
theoretic arguments. The equilibria in Proposition 3 all satisfy the most stringent requirements 
which have been proposed to refine the sequential equilibrium concept (cf. note 3). In case c 
<  b I  <  b z, one could perhaps argue in favor of the payoff-dominating equilibrium LE3, but 
strictly speaking, such payoff considerations only bite in normative analysis. Also, a case could 
perhaps be made in favor of the LE which is most favorable for G, since it is G's beliefs and 
strategy which (if known to F before it chooses its signal) 'force' F to send a message in LE2, 
LE4 and LE5. 
10. It is difficult to think of situations where b I  >  b 2. A  somewhat contrived example is the fol- 
lowing. Suppose that G considers whether (x2) or not (Xl) to grant (a fixed amount of) invest- 
ment subsidies  -  such as  for  the purpose of technological  development -  to  a  particular 
branche of industry in which there is one big firm (F) and several smaller firms. Suppose that 
G wants to play x 2 if especially the smaller firms will benefit from x 2 (0  =  02) but not if mainly 
F will benefit from x 2 (0 =  01), and that F knows 0. In this case F's benefits from x 2 are larger 
if 0  =  01 than if 0  =  02: b I  >  b 2. Proposition  1 suggests that in this case, F  will not send a 
message on its private information, in order to pledge for x 2. 
11. Costless messages can have an impact in case there is no conlict of interest between G and F, 
that is, if b I  <  c  =  0  <  b 2 (cf. note 4). To see this, define ml:  =  '0  =  01'  and m2:  =  '0  = 
02'. It is easy to check that the following strategies are a  LE: pl(ml)  =  1, p2(m2)  =  1, o(ml) 
=  0, tr(m2)  =  1. The fact that costless messages can be informative only if the sender's prefer- 
ence ordering (over the receiver's actions) is dependent on its private information is demon- 
strated in a  more general setting in the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). 
12. In condition (1), however, I~sPi(s)  =  1 has to be replaced by JsPi(s)ds  =  1. 
13. We could assume that a lobbying message bears a  (fixed) cost, d say, to policymaker as well. 
G's payoff in LE2 now is: EG(LE2)  =  (1- p)a 1  +  p(a  2- d).  This payoff still exceeds the 
payoff in case of no lobbying  -  (1 -p)a I if p  <  a, and pa  2 if p  >  a  -  provided that d  < 
min  [ al(l -  p)/p,a 21. 
14. Similarly, in Milgrom's (198 l) model costless messages are informative due to the assumption 
that lying is impossible (cp. lr I =  0), and in Kambhu's (1988) model messages are informative 
due to the assumption that true reports are always accepted, whereas false message are rejected 
with a  positive probability (cp.  7i"  I  <  1,  7r  2  =  1). 
15. The presence of two interested audiences may also affect the scope for information tranfer and 
the incentives to send messages (Farrell and Gibbons, 1985). For instance, a firm may be reluc- 
tant to report in public on its need for subsidies or protection.  Although this might elicit a 
favorable response from policymakers, it might simultaneously elicit an unfavorable one from 
shareholders. 
16. Mueller and Murrell (1986) find some support for the hypothesis that the number of active in- 
terest groups in a  country is positively related to the size of government. This is in line with 
our result that lobbying is more likely to occur when there is more at stake (a larger government 
involvement). 
17. It should be noted that the empirical regularity itself is not completely undisputed (cf. Schloz- 
man and Tierney,  1986: 313). 
18. It is interesting to note that these assertions at the same time provide some empirical support 
for the selection of LE5 in Proposition 3. The policymaker's response is favorable [a(m)  = 
1] but the message does not induce a change in behavior, relative to G's prior beliefs [o(m)  = 
o(q(m))  =  a(p)]. The chairman of the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (FNV) conjectures 289 
in similar vein that "lobbying is just like advertising: one has to do it because everyone else 
does it. But the question is what it yields" (Stekelenburg, 1988: 44). 
19. It is noteworthy that also experimental studies suggest that the persuasiveness of a communica- 
tion is negatively related to the self-interest or stake of the communicator (Tedeshi et al., 1973: 
92). 
20. For instance, it is ranked first by the major interest groups which try to influence the policy 
of the European Community (Kirchner and Schwaiger,  1981). 
21. The  importance  of  competition  in  informational  lobbying  should  not  be  exaggerated, 
however. Schlozman and Tierney (1986:  213) report a number of studies where it was found 
that in a majority of cases and arena's interest groups were active only on one side of the issue. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma. Assume that in some equilibrium there exist messages m I and m 2 such that 
a(m l)  <  tr(m2). Then due to b i  >  0, i  =  1, 2, both types of F  would prefer to send message m 2 
rather than m 1. Consequently, in the equilibrium pi(m 1)  =  0 for i  =  1, 2, and message m I is not 
sent with positive probability.  QED. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume to the contrary that ,o  i  >  0 for some i. This strategy can only be 
a best response if o(m*) -  a(n)  >_ ¢4b  i >  0. To derive a contradiction we shall deal separately with 
cases that (a) p  <  c~ and (b) p  >  a. 
(a) o(m*) _> a(n) +  c/b  i >  0 requires that q(m*) -> ~ or, equivalently, P2 > P l [ (1 -  p)~/[p(1 -  ~)] }. 
Since p  <  ct, necessarily P2  >  Pl.  In turn 02  >  0 requires a(m*) -  tr(n)  _>  c/b  2.  But then, since 
b I  >  b2, o(m*)-o(n)  >  c/bx, implying Pl  =  1. As a  consequence, P2  >  Pl cannot hold. 
(b) a(n)  _<  o(m*)-c/b i  <  1 requires q(n)  _<  a,  or,  equivalently,  (1-P2)  <  (1-p010-p)c~/ 
[p(1-c0]].  Since p  >  a, necessarily p 2 >  Pl ifPl  <  1 andp2  =  Pl ifPl  =  1. If pl  <  1 then, by 
c/b  2 >  c/b I  >  a(m*)- tr(n), F 2 will play P2  =  0, which contradicts P2 >  Pl- Hence, assume p~  = 
P2  =  1 implying that  q(n)  cannot be  updated  by  Bayes'  rule  (the  denominator is zero).  The 
additional condition in (3), however, requires that q(n)  =  1 implying o(n)  =  I, which contradicts 
o(n)  <  1.  To see this, note that, due to b I  >  b 2, F 2 has a  strong incentive to deviate from s  = 
m* to s  =  n, whenever F l has a  weak incentive to do so. Hence, the off-equilibrium signal s  = 
n  is more likely to come from F 2.  QED. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) First, note that the sequential equilibrium with Pl  =  P2  =  0,  o(n)  = 291 
0, and o(m*) <_ c/b  2 is not an LE. Although, q(m*) cannot be determined by Bayes' rule, the ad- 
ditional  condition requires that q(m*)  =  1 since,  by b 2  >  b l, F 2 is more likely to send the off- 
equilibrium  signal  s  =  m* than F I.  In turn,  q(m*)  =  1 implies a(m*)  =  1,  which  upsets the 
equilibrium with 01  =  o2  =  0. Hence, it must hold that 0i  >  0 for some i, requiring a(m*) >_ a(n) 
+  c/b i >  0. To support this we need q(m*) _>  c~, or, equivalently, 02  -> Pl  [(1- p)ot/[p(1- ¢x)] 1. 
It follows that q(n)  <  a  -  implying o(n)  =  0  -  and that 01  <  1. Hence, we have 0  <  a(m*)  < 
c/b I  <  1,  which requires q(m*)  =  cz.  By b I  <  b2, this necessarily leads  to 02  =  1 and ot  = 
p(1-a)/[(1-p)c~[.  Furthermore, 0  <  01  <  1,  requires that o(m*)  =  c/b 1. 
(b) Due to b I  <  c, necessarily, 01  =  0. Furthermore, 01  =  Pz  =  0, o(n)  =  0, a(m*) _< c/b  2 is not 
an LE. The off-equilibrium message s  =  m* is most likely to come from F z (b I  <  c  <  b2), and 
hence, the additional condition in (3) requires that q(m*) =  1, implying o(m*) =  1. Consequently, 
we must have 01  =  0 and 02  =  1, implying q(n)  =  0 and q(m*)  =  1, and or(n)  =  0 and o(m*)  = 
1.  QED. 
Proof of Proposition  3. (a) First, note that  1  >  Pl  =  02  >  0 implies by Bayes' rule that q(n)  = 
q(m °)  >  c~,  leading  to  o(n)  =  a(m*)  =  1.  This  cannot  be  an  equilibrium  since,  by  c  > 
bi[o(m*  )-  o(n)], both F 1 and F 2 would want to deviate to ol  =  o2  =  0, which leads to LE3.  In 
LE3, condition (3) does not restrict q(m°), which justifies o(m*) =  1. Moreover, if G unexpectedly 
receives a  message, then a(m*)  =  1 is the only response which is consistent with another LE in 
this regime (LE4 or LE5; see below). Second, Pl  =  02  =  1,  a(m*)  =  1 leads to LE5.  Now, q(n) 
cannot be determined by Bayes's rule, but the additional condition requires that q(n) =  0 and a(n) 
=  0, since F 1 (b I  <  b2) is the type which has the weakest disincentive to deviate from s  =  m ° to 
s  =  n. Finally,  assume that 01  ~  02. Then it must hold that o(m*)-a(n)  >_  c/b  2,  requiring q(n) 
_<  (x, or, equivalently,  (1-02)  <  (1-ol)[c~(1-p)/[p(1-c0]}  -<  (1-01).  Now, from 01  <  Pz, it 
follows that q(m*) >  p  >  c~, and hence that o(m*) =  1. Furthermore, 0  _< Pl  <  02  -<  1, requires 
that (0 <)  1 -c/b  I  <  o(n) _<  1 -c/b 2 (<  1). For 0  <  o(n) <  1 it is needed that q(n)  =  c~, which, 
due to b I  <  b2, can only hold if 01  =  0  and 02  =  1 -(1 -p)a/[p(1  -a)].  F2's mixed strategy is 
a  best response -  condition (1) -  only if b2[cr(m*)-(r(n)]  =  c.  Part (b) of the proposition, now 
is trivial.  QED. 
Proof of Proposition  4. (a) It is straightforward to verify that the strategies satisfy conditions (1)- 
(3). [Moreover, uniqueness can be proved -  although not trivially -,  by first proving that s  =  s ÷ 
is the only signal which is sent with positive probability by both types.] (b) It is again easy to check 
that the strategies are a LE. Strictly speaking, the equilibrium strategy of F 1 given in the proposi- 
tion is not unique. In fact F l is indifferent between s  =  0 and s  =  b I . It is also a  LE for F 1 to 
send s  =  b I with positive probability, provided that pl(bl)  =  1 -pI(0)  <  p(1 -  a)/[(1 -  p)u]. Only 
in that case we have q(bl) _< ct, which is needed to justify a(bl)  =  1. Note, however, that he strate- 
gies given in the proposition are the limit,  as e  -0,  of the strategy combination p2(bl  +  e)  =  1, 
pl(bl  +  ~)  =  1 -pl(0)  =  0,  in which F 2 'competes out'  F 1.  QED. 
Remark. If p  >  c~, then there are multiple equilibria. For instance, for any s' with 0  _<  s'  _<  b 1, 
it is a  LE for both F 1 and F 2 to send s' with probability  1 and  for G  to respond with a(s')  =  1. 
This result, however, is an artifact of the assumption that X  =  {x l, x 2 }. If X  is a  continuum then 
there can only by separating or (semi-)pooling on the highest signal as in Proposition 4 (see Cho 
and Sobel,  1990). 
Proof of Proposition  5. (a) First,  assume that Pl  =  02  =  1.  Then Bayes'  rule leads to  q(n)  = 
p(1- 7r2)/[(1-p)(1- rl)  +  p(1- r2)  ]  <  p  <  a, implying a(n)  =  0. Hence, Pl  =  1 requires that 
~r(m)  _< c/0qbl)[>  c/(~r2b2)>0]. Clearly, this requirement is satisfied by a(m)  =  1. In turn, a(m) 
=  1 requires that q(m) =  p~2/[(1 -  p)~r I + P~r2] >- c~, which can only hold if ~  _>  1. However, with 292 
/~  <  1, Pl  =  P2  =  1 cannot be an LE.  In this latter case, similar reasoning as in the proof of 
Proposition 2(a) leads to the (unique) LE of Proposition 5(ai). 
(b) Due to ~rlbl[o(m)-a(n)]  _<  7rib I  <  c, we must have Pl  =  0,  and consequently, Bayes' rule 
leads to q(n) _<  p  <  ct and o(n)  =  0. Moreover, if p2  >  0, then Bayes' rule leads to q(m)  =  l, 
and hence, a(m)  =  I. Due to 7r2bE[O(m  )-o(n)]  =  7fEb  2  >  c it follows that P2  =  1.  QED. 
Remark. With p  >  c~, similar to Proposition 3,  there are multiple LE. 